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Volume XXIX March, 1941 Number 3
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOME RECENT KENTUCKY
PROPERTY TAX CASES*
By JAxEs W. MAnTiN**
In general the cases selected as a basis for discussion fall into
the practical categories of (a) those having to do -with the scope
of the Kentucky property tax and (b) those concerning assess-
ments.1 To make it easy for one who has not currently studied
tax cases to follow the comment on their consequences, I shall
undertake a layman's analysis of the setting of and decision in
each case or group of cases.
One caution is essential to an interpretation of the practical
significance of recent tax cases. An attorney-and especially a
judge-is perforce concerned primarily with justice for litigants.
The general tax student like myself is much more solicitious as
to the bearing of any particular case on taxpayers who are not
litigants. The reason is that there are more non-litigants than
parties to law suits, and that much more money is involved.
Moreover, the practical operations of the tax program are
matters which intimately concern all taxpayers and our tax
administration; whereas, by the very nature of our legal pro-
cesses, the courts ordinarily settle only subject matter specifically
presented in a controversy; and court decisions must, therefore,
deal with segments rather than with the entirety of individual
tax problems.
* This paper is the substance of an address delivered before the
Kentucky Bar Association's conference in Ashland, Kentucky, in
October, 1940.
** Director, Bureau of Business Research, University of Kentucky,
formerly Kentucky Commissioner of Revenue.
ISignificant legal developments affecting enforcement of tax col-
lections are excluded. Most legal issues have been studied recently
by Earl Wilson, Sale of Land for Taxes in Kentucky, 28 Ky. L. J.
105 (1940).
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I. APPLICATION OF THE KENTUCKY PROPERTY TAX
The High Splint Coal Case2
In recent political campaigns, a definite view that the people
of Kentucky desire repeal of the state real property tax has
developed. Some political leaders privately admit that one of the
reasons the proposal has been emphasized lies in the fact that
many voters think repeal of the state property tax would mean
elimination of the tax bill paid annually to the sheriff; thus,
perhaps the issue has been given more emphasis than is involved
in the difference between a five-cents-a-hundred tax and no state
levy. In any event both political parties in the 1935 campaign
favored repeal of the state real property tax.
In keeping with his commitment, Governor A. B. Chandler
recommended to the 1935 General Assembly elimination of the
state levy.3 In addition to repeal of the state real estate tax4 two
other provisions in the bill caused difficulty. The first sought to
take away the authority of the state tax department to equalize
assessments of real property.5 On technical grounds this change
was subject to grave objection,6 but no one in the General Assem-
bly seems to have offered adverse arguments. The second pro-
vision, the one that gave rise to litigation, required that the Ken-
tucky tax commission asssess mineral property3 Although it
appears that no objection to this centralization of responsibility
was raised, it proved, when enacted, to be difficult of interpre-
tation because the verbiage lacked precision.8 In consequence
the tax department called a conference of interested taxpayers-
especially owners of oil, gas, and coal properties-and sought
advice concerning suitable regulations for distinguishing that
property subject to state assessment from that subject to local
assessment. It was understood that the action of the department
would be made the subject matter of a declaratory judgment suit,
2 Martin et al. v. High Splint Coal Company, 268 Ky. 11, 103 S. W.
(2d) 711 (1937).
"1 Kentucky House Journal, Jan. 7, 1936, p. 15, 22.
'Acts of the General Assembly, 1936, chap. 99, sec. 1.
Ibid., sec. 2.4 National Association of Assessing Officers' Committee on Assess-
ment Organization and Personnel, Equalization Agencies (1940),
especially pp. 33 ff.
* Acts, op. cit, supra, note 4.
* The provision at the end of sec. 3 read: "The State Tax Commis-
sion shall have exclusive power in the assessment of all minerals."
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so that property owners might know whether their holdings were
required to be listed with the state department or with the
county tax commissioner, and what duties this statute required
of the tax commission.
Pursuant to the regulations attempting an interpretation of
the statute, counsel for three corporations and one individual,
whose holdings introduced practically all the variable situations
believed to be usual, filed a suit. The Court of Appeals on
MIarch 26, 1937, handed down a forcible opinion written by Judge
Thomas9 in which a fundamental constitutional tax question
was decided. Instead of dealing with the comparatively unim-
portant question of whether or not the regulation correctly inter-
preted the statute, the Court dealt solely with whether or not
chapter ninety-eight of the Acts of the Regular Session, 1936
was constitutional. The Court sustained the opinion of the trial
judge that the entire chapter was unconstitutional and void.
In the decision two important questions were involved: (a)
whether or not the bill sought to provide unconstitutional
exemption, and (b) whether or not, in the event it did so, the
1934 legislation sought to be repealed would continue to prevail.
With the latter question we are not now concerned, mainly
because no unique issue seems to have been involved. It is im-
portant, however, that the Court held section 170 of the Consti-
tution to require that the state government tax all classes of
property. In effect, this decision appears to mean that the pro-
hibition against any exemption applies specifically to state taxa-
tion and not merely to some taxing jurisdiction; that is to say,
the Constitution does not merely require that some jurisdiction
impose a tax. To the Kentucky bar this decision, once the gen-
eral interpretation adhered to by the Court is agreed upon, may
seem inevitable. To the student of comparative tax policies such
is not the case, since many state constitutions do not as emphatic-
ally segregate fiscal provisions as does the Kentucky document.
One phase of the Kentucky Constitution concerns state govern-
ment; another phase, largely separate, local government.
Perhaps the first practical implication of this case lies in the
finding that no class of property in Kentucky can be exempt from
state taxation. This is important in a number of practical direc-
tions, and concrete illustrations may be cited.
' Martin v. High Splint Coal Company, supra, note 2.
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Shortly after the High Splint Coal Company ease was
decided, it became necessary for the department of revenue to
deal with general language in a statute providing for rural elec-
trification cooperatives and requiring that each such enterprise
pay $10.00 in lieu of other taxes.10 The specific issue was whether
this exemption provision comprehended property taxes. The
department, in the light of the High Splint Coal Company case,
proceeded on the assumption that the General Assembly, knowing
the Constitution and realizing it required all property not
expressly exempted therein to be taxed, simply did not mention
property taxation. It was therefore held as a matter of course
that rural electrification cooperatives were subject to property
taxation. In the light of the Court's opinion in the High Splint
Coal Company case, no particular issue appears to be involved in
this decision; but the ruling involved another point which the
Court may find it necessary to interpret, namely whether or not
the general provision as to exemption applied to local property
taxes, despite the fact that nothing in the statute expressly so
indicated. Relying on the language of Judge Thomas in the
High Splint Coal Company case, the department of revenue
took the position that an exemption provision should be inter-
preted strictly against the person claiming it and necessarily held
that the cooperatives were subject to both state and local taxa-
tion." If the Court's opinion has been read aright, the High
1' The language of the relevant section (Acts of the General Assem-
bly, Fourth Extra Session, 1936, chap. 6, sec 27, Baldwin's Kentucky
Statute Service, Oct., 1939, sec. 883j-28) is as follows. "Corporations
formed hereunder shall be exempt from all franchise taxes, profit taxes,
gross and net taxes, sales taxes, occupation taxes, privilege taxes,
income taxes, any and all taxes on electric current consumed and from
all excise taxes whatsoever, any statute or statutes now existing or
hereafter passed to the contrary notwithstanding. In lieu of any and
all other taxes, state, county, municipal and/or local corporations
formed under this act being non-profit cooperative organizations shall
pay annually to the treasurer of the Commonwealth of Kentucky an
annual tax of $10.00."
2 The language of the first part of the section, from which men-
tion of any ad valorem property tax, state or local, is conspicuous by
its absence, appears to strengthen materially the case against exemp-
tion. As a general proposition, a specific enumeration-especially
as in this case, one which lacks a general catch-all provision-is inter-
preted to be an all-inclusive listing. For example, in the section
quoted in the preceding note, the list of taxes from which exemption
is provided can on this principle be deemed to include all such taxes;
and levies on property imposed ad valorem, either state or local, are
not expressly or implledly included. Of course, the property tax can-
not be contemplated as among "any other taxes, state, county, muni-
cipal and/or local . . ." since a flat $10.00 tax obviously cannot
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Splint Coal Company case provides the state tax department a
basis of procedure for both of these important issues.
Most students of property taxation, and notably Professor
Jens P. Jensen, 12 have recommended major adjustments in its
base. 13 Jensen proposes, as do many of his colleagues, that
representative intangible property should not be subject to taxa-
tion. This class would include, for example, a mortgage on real
estate. Jensen's view, conceivably, might also be interpreted,
but with less reason, to propose exemption of stock in a corpora-
tion whose property is situated in the state.14 Professor Jensen,
moreover, like most other critical students of tax policy, pro-
poses elimination of certain classes of tangible personal property
from the tax base.' 5 Under the doctrine of the High Splint
Coal Company case, the express provisions of the Constitution
preclude such reforms in the operation of our ad valorem tax.
It may be pointed out in compensation for this seeming
objection that the Constitution also renders less practical a type
of property tax "jockeying" for partisan political purposes
which might otherwise be expected and which indeed seems to
have been involved in the statute that gave rise to the construe-
tion.1  Many other "urgent necessities" for exemption of
specific classes of property may have been forestalled by reason
of the Constitution's anti-exemption provision as interpreted.
Since the legislature may set state property tax rates, however,
this case does not eliminate, but merely impedes, partisan
maneuvers which could be effected more freely but for the
Constitution as interpreted in Judge Thomas' opinion.
One practical implication of this decision involves both
economic and legal theory. The immediate result of the High
Splint Coal Company case is to leave in doubt whether the state
General Assembly can constitutionally free from property tax
constitutionally be substituted for an ad valorem levy. Const., sec.
174.
" The General Property Tax, the Mainstay of the Local Fiscal
Autonomy, 183 Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 124 ff. (Jan., 1936).
"Ibid., p. 128.
"'Note that, on petition for rehearing, such an exemption was
sustained in Commonwealth v. Walsh's Trustee, 133 Ky. 103, 117
S. W. 398 (1909).
Jensen, supra, note 12.
'Acts of the General Assembly, 1936, Regular Session, Chap.
98, codified as section 4019-1 to 4019-4 of Baldwin's 1936 Revision of
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1936 ed.
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the'shares of stock in a corporation which pays tax on 75 per
cent of more of its property in Kentucky.'7 The original
decision with respect to the validity of the 75-per-cent provision
was grounded primarily on the doctrine that the shares of stock
in a corporation were a "phase" of the property in the tangible
assets of the corporation. If this view of the situation can be
maintained, then much of what has been said above is economic-
ally unsound, because farm mortgages are a more thoroughly
representative variety of property-more nearly, from an
economic viewpoint, only a "phase'--than are shares of stock
in corporations and so, for that matter, are corporate mortgage
bonds and numerous other classes of intangible personal
property' ordinarily classified by economists as representative
intangibles and by lawyers simply as intangible personal
property. In other words, the economic consequences of Martin
v. The High Splint Coal Company are diametrically opposed in
principle to the economic consequences of Commonwealth v.
Walsh's Trustees.'9
The Sutcliffe Case20
A second problem touching the application of the Kentucky
property tax to an important class of estates is dealt with in the
recent Suteliffe case, and it is therefore well that the situation
giving rise to the case be reviewed. If, under a will or a deed of
trust, a trustee holds intangible property for the benefit of a local
resident, the problem of situs for taxation is not seriously
raised. As our national financial organization has grown
increasingly complicated, it has become more and more usual
for trusts for the benefit of persons in all states to be established
in financial centers, such as New York, Chicago, and Boston.
This practice has resulted in a variety of legal problems one of
the most serious of which concerned the situs of the intangibles
for property tax purposes. Certainly in the case of irrevocable
trusts such, for example, as those established by will, the trustor
can by no stretch of the imagination be deemed responsible for
listing and paying taxes. But the situation is not so clear as
1"As provided in section 4088, Carroll's Kentucky Statutes and
sustained in Commonwealth v. Walsh's Trustee, loc. cit.
I S. E. Leland, The Classified Property Tax, 110 ff.
Supra, note 12.
'Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel., Martin v. Elbert Gary
Sutcliife, 283 Ky. 274, 140 S. W. (2d) 1028 (1940).
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between the trustee, on the one hand, and the beneficiary, on the
other. For many years those states which tax intangible
property as such have in some instances provided by statute that
the trustee as legal owner of the property should be taxable,
and other states have provided with similar persistence that the
beneficiary as the equitable owner should be required to list the
property and pay taxes. An example of the first policy is found
in Illinois ;21 and of the second, in Kentucky.22
For many years it appeared that no tax on beneficiaries has
been contested in court. As a practical matter this absence of
litigation seems to have arisen in some measure from the view
that it was cheaper to pay taxes than to contest a doubtful
point; but it has resulted largely from the fact that, if property
were subject to tax on one basis, administrative officers have
been reluctant to enforce other levies on a second basis. The
situation has been ameliorated also by the fact that for some time
neither New York nor Massachusetts have imposed ad valorem
taxes on intangibles. The first important case involving the
issue as to whether the beneficiary was liable for property taxes
on such intangible property appears to have arisen only a dozen
years ago in the case of Safe Deposit and Trust Company of
Baltimore v. Commonwealth of Virginia,2 3 although a number of
cases involving the situs of such property for death taxes had
been previously decided. The Safe Deposit case determined
definitely that the corpus of trust property held by the trustee
in Baltimore was not subject to a Virginia tax against a bene-
ficiary domiciled in that state. In a concurring opinion
Mr. Justice Stone made the point that the decision did not settle
the issue as to whether Virginia might have imposed a tax on the
resident's beneficial interest as distinguished from the corpus.
This reserved question appears not to have been raised in
the highest court of any state or in a federal court until the
issue came before the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the case of
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Elbert Gary Sutcliffe.2 4 In this
case the Court of Appeals held that the beneficial interest of
Sutcliffe in a trust created under the will of his grandfather,
Elbert H. Gary, New York Trust Company trustee, was subject
Illinois Revised Stat. 1937, chap. 120, secs. 6, 19.
"In addition to the Sutcliffe case, see statutory provisions and
cases cited therein.
50 Sup. Ct. 59, 280 U. S. 83, 74 L. Ed. 180 (1929).
Supra, note 20.
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to tax in Kentucky where Suteliffe has resided since 1932.
The Suteliffe case involved an extreme example in that the terms
of the trust instrument made it impossible for the beneficiary to
assign his interest or any part of it and left him without the
slightest control over the trust. The only right Sutcliffe enjoyed
was the right to the net income.
It is of interest that, two or three days following the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania independently handed down the Stewart opinion 25 dealing
with a comparable situation. The Pennsylvania view is some-
what more elaborately explained, but the result and apparently
the theory on which the result is based are exactly the same as
in the Kentucky case.
As a practical matter, the major significance of the Sut-
cliffe and Stewart cases is that, no matter how extreme the
arrangement, the courts seem to take a position which precludes
contracting away through the mechanism of a trust any element
of tax liability that the parties might otherwise incur.26 In view
of the fact that New York does not impose any tax on such trust
property, the situation would have become very inviting had the
Court held otherwise. It is conceivable that the Court might
have held in this case that Sutcliffe was not liable for taxation
in Kentucky but that any beneficiary of a New York trust which
had been created for the purpose of avoiding Kentucky taxes
would be liable. Aside from being an administrative monstro-
sity, such a definition of the law would have been inconsistent
from an economic point of view since the beneficiary in the case
of each of the two trusts would have been in a precisely similar
situation-one of them subject to tax, the other not. Thus,
from the point of view of preventing other Kentuckians from
having to assume the taxes of such beneficiaries through
increased levies on themselves, from the point of view of sound
administration, and from the point of view of equalization of
tax load, the Sutcliffe decision, sustained and bolstered by the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the Stewart
case, must be accepted as an unmixed blessing.
Although implicit in what has already been said, it may
perhaps be pointed out that in some instances including that of
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 338 Pa. 9, 12 Atl. (2d) 444 (1940).
2'Of course this has been the law all along, but some eminent
counselors believed the trust route offered a means of escape.
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Mr. Sutcliffe the trust arrangement was not effected for the
purpose of avoiding taxes. Thus, the direct result in this case
is simply to preclude an incidental rather than a designed
avoidance of the property tax. In general, therefore, the con-
sequence of the decision is to cut off both deliberate and acci-
dental elision of tax liability.
Franchise Tax Cases
Two recent cases decided by the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals make clear specific applications of the Kentucky
franchise tax act. The Consolidation Coal Company case27
requires the application of this tax law to a corporation engaged
primarily in the coal mining and selling business but operating
an electric current producing and distributing enterprise
mainly as a convenience for its own employees. The only
generally significant issue determined by this litigation is that
the electric business is subject to tax notwithstanding that it is
not carried on as a means of earning profits but rather as a
means of facilitating an industrial concern's other activities.
Practically, the case seems to settle that all coal concerns gener-
ally must report to the state department of revenue and pay
franchise tax the same as other electric companies in respect of
property used in producing and distributing current, even
though they do so merely to promote coal mining.
The second franchise tax case28 involved application of the
same statute to a pipe-line company which did not hold itself out
as transporting oil for the public-which, in other words, was
not a common carrier. The statute, however, required that the
"pipe-line company" be subjected to the tax, and it also sub-
jected to the tax any corporation having privileges not enjoyed
by natural persons. A pipe-line company has the right of
eminent domain, although the Producers' Pipe-line Company
had not exercised that right. The consequence of the court's
decision that this company is liable for franchise taxes will be
to set at rest any doubt that gas and oil transporters by pipe-
line will be required to report and pay the tax without regard
to whether or not they function as common carriers.
Consolidation Coal Company v. Martin, 113 F. (2d) 813 (1940).
: Martin v. Producers' Pipe Line Co., 113 F. (2d) 817 (1940).
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The Madden Case29
The Madden case concerns the Kentucky classification of
property for taxation. It will be recalled that prior to 1917
Kentucky adhered to the uniform-rate general property tax
plan. In that year the Commonwealth enacted a comprehensive
classification of property in connection with which, among other
things, it was provided that choses in action and other intangible
property should generally be subject to a rate of 40 cents on each
$100 valuation and should not be taxed locally.30 At the same
time it was provided that deposits in state banks organized
under the laws of Kentucky and in national banks in
the Commonwealth should be taxed 10 cents on each
$100 valuation. Numerous other provisions were incorporated
in the statute, and most of them have been adjudicated. 31
This case involved among other things the taxation of cer-
tain bank deposits in New York owned at the time of his death
by Mr. Madden, resident of Fayette County, Kentucky. The
issue was originally tried in the Fayette County Court when
the Commonwealth sought to list and tax property restrospec-
tively. It was tried de novo in the Fayette Circuit Court,
appealed to the Court of Appeals, sent back to the Circuit Court,
and again brought before the Court of Appeals on a point
already decided. 32 The case was subsequently appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States on the contention that the
interpretation placed upon the statute by the Kentucky Court,
that is, that "bank deposits" in New York City should be taxed
at 50 cents on the $100 even though bank deposits in Kentucky
were subject to tax of 10 cents, denied the estate due process
and equal protection of the laws and was in conflict with the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Commonwealth insisted that the statute provided
a reasonable classification because of the extraordinary con-
venience afforded in the administration of the Kentucky bank
' John E. Madden, Jr., Executor of the Estate of J. E. Madden v.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky, 60 Sup. Ct. 406, 309 U. S. 83, 84
L. Ed. 590 (1940).
'This provision was later changed to require a tax of 50 cents
on each $100.
' See the cases cited in Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1936 edition,
and supplements thereto, especially at section 4019a-10.
"Commonwealth v. Madden's Executor, 265 Ky. 684, 97 S. W.(2d) 561 (1936), and 277 Ky. 343, 126 S. W. (2d) 463 (1939).
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deposits tax which was lacking in the administration of the
general intangible property tax, particularly on bank deposits
in institutions outside Kentucky. The Supreme Court sus-
tained the position of the state and also dealt with the allegation
that the statute as interpreted abridged the citizens' privileges
and immunities in that it taxed bank deposits outside of the
Commonwealth owned by residents at a higher rate than those
within Kentucky. Incident to holding that the privileges and
immunities with which the. Fourteenth Amendment is con-
cerned are those of federal citizenship as such and not those of
state citizenship, the Court reviewed and overruled the case of
Colgate v. Harvey.3 3
The general effect of this decision is to sustain this residual
phase of the Kentucky statute which had not previously been
subject to judicial review. Thus, approval of the Commonwealth's
policy reflected in a tax five times as high for out-of-state bank
deposits as for Kentucky bank deposits, dignifies administra-
tive considerations to an extent that has seldom been evidenced
in the decisions of our courts. The basis for this classification is
the feasibility of assessing and collecting at its initial source all
tax due and the consequent greater fairness of the ten-cent tax
than of a higher rate, since the former could not be made ap-
plicable to all bank deposits.
A second result of great practical importance is added
evidence that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky and the
Supreme Court of the United States3 4 are disposed to entrust
the legislature with responsibility for determining tax policy.
So far as Kentucky residents are concerned, it may be reason-
ably concluded that the general classification statute has been
sustained on all important points so far as they relate to the
right of the legislature to classify.35
II. ASSESSMENT CASES
In examining certain recent decisions concerning valuation
for tax purposes, cases arising from property tax administra-
56 Sup. Ct. 252, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. Ed. 299, 102 A. L. R. 54(1939).
' Note still more emphatic evidence as to the latter in Wisconsin
et al. v. J. C. Penny Co., decided Dec. 16, 1940, 61 Sup. Ct. 246, 85
L. Ed. 222.
'There has been no adjudication of a recent statute providing
that debit accounts of brokerage houses be classified to be taxed at a
lower rate than are other accounts receivable.
K. L. J.-2
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tion and others from inheritance taxation are to be considered
because, as recently pointed out by the Court of Appeals, 0 the
same constitutional principles of valuation are applicable. In
general, it is important to keep in mind that the Kentucky
statutes authorize judicial review of the facts as well as the law
in each taxation case that is, the courts may, if they so elect,
review the valuation.
One case is found in the appeal by Dumesnil.3 7 In this
instance two issues were involved: first, whether or not the appli-
cation of the inheritance tax to specified insurance policies was
valid and, second, whether or not the department erred in
valuing certain securities. It is only the second issue that re-
quires consideration. The record disclosed testimony for the
taxpayer by a competent expert that he believed the stock pri-
marily in question was worth not more than $90 a share. Three
witnesses for the Commonwealth testified, two of them valuation
witnesses and the other the inheritance tax supervisor. Both
the former had valued the stock at $150 a share and the
department, on the basis of that testimony, of evidence that the
corporation, the stock of which was involved, had accepted for
corporate taxation, a higher valuation, and of a showing that the
corporation, in addition to fixed property, had net liquid assets
actually worth about $125 a share, found a value of $125 a share.
When the Court of Appeals reviewed the finding of the depart-
ment of revenue, which had been sustained by the trial court,
the Court expressed doubt about the valuation but took the
position that the action of the Kentucky tax commission "the
tribunal on whom is imposed by law the duty of fixing a val-
uation for tax purposes," should not be set aside in the absence
of a clear-cut showing that it had erred and the taxpayer, so
it was held, had failed to make such a demonstration.
Even more recently a like result has been reached under
somewhat similar eircumstanees.38 This case involved the assess-
ment by the same department of distilled spirits in bonded ware-
houses and sought to have the assessment set aside on the ground
that the department had been guilty of constructive fraud.
Stored spirits were assessed at $18 a barrel rather than at a
I Dumesnil v. Reeves, 283 Ky. 563, 142 S. W. (2d) 132 (1940).
'Loc. cit.
City of Louisville v. Kentucky Tax Commission, 284 Ky. 490,
144 S. W. 1034 (2d) (1940).
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graduated and much higher valuation. The flat-rate assessment
had been predicated largely on ease of administration; but it
was not made until the department had computed valuations
on the basis of a grading plan formerly in use in Kentucky
(though not commonly employed in other states). The $18
figure was an approximation of the average which would have
been reached on the basis of a graduation of value according to
the age of the whiskey. The flat-rate assessment plan had been
dropped the previous year on the ground that taxpayers had
declined unanimously to consent. In the valuation under attack,
however, all the taxpayers had agreed after careful computa-
tion that the difference in any particular taxpayer's bill would
be insiguficant as a result of the changed plan of valuation.
For the first year the plan operated, however, it did result in an
incidental reduction in the proportion of alcoholic beverages
apportioned to Jefferson County and the city of Louisville; and
it was on that ground primarily that these taxing districts
objected to the valuation. Again the Court of Appeals ruled
that it would decline to substitute its own judgment for that of
the Kentucky tax commission which is vested by law with
administrative responsibility for making the assessment.
The general import of these and related decisions for assess-
ment administration is obvious. In the first place it may be
expected that the Kentucky tax commission, knowing that it is
held responsible by the courts for accurate appraisals, will con-
tinue to exercise great care in arriving at a fair valuation.
Since the commission is continuously engaged in the appraisal
of property and since it has competent legal, statistical, account-
ing, and appraisal technicians conveniently at hand, there is
little doubt but that the commission's findings, even in doubtful
cases, will be more nearly sound from an economic viewpoint
than will those arrived at by an appellate court on the basis of a
record.
The viewpoint adopted by the Court should eliminate a
large proportion of tax litigation which would otherwise occur.
Thus, the Commonwealth, as such, enjoys a saving in that it
need not bring its judicial machinery into operation to deal
with an essentially administrative task. In addition, the in-
dividual and corporate taxpayers of the state may secure their
rights with greater economy and efficiency and without the
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undue delays and consequent interruptions of business which
grow out of extensive litigation.
So far as the extent of judicial review in Kentucky is
concerned, recent decisions, climaxed by the two just cited, have
placed the state very nearly in line with the best policy author-
ity. This result has stemmed primarily from the wisdom of the
Court of Appeals rather than from statutory restrictions such as
authorities on tax policy commend.39 Perhaps it may be of
interest to foot-note this observation by referring briefly to the
latest expression by competent authority on this subject.
Some three years ago the president of the National Asso-
ciation of Assessing Officers 40 appointed a committee on Assess-
ment Organization and Personnel composed of four outstand-
ing local assessors and one state assesor with the charge that
these five men study the subject fully and report recommenda-
tions to the Association's national convention. At the end of
three years study, the committee unanimously reported to the
Baltimore conference on September 11, 1940; and the report,
so far as it concerned judicial review, was adopted without
dissent. Among other recommendations are the following,
which seem to demonstrate a close conformity-so far as Ken-
tucky legislation permits-between the viewpoint made possible
by recent decisions of the Court of Appeals and this nation-wide
authority.41
' National Association of Assessing Officers' Committee on
Assessment Organization and Personnel, Judicial Review Agencies,(1939) 18ff. (and the Association's report on Assessment Organization
and Personnel (1940), see. IX); Kentucky Efficiency Commission,
Revenue and Taxation (1923), 97-98; Ohio Tax and Revenue Commis-
sion, Preliminary Report of General Findings and Recommendations
(1938), 7; M. S. Culp. Administrative Remedies in the Assessment
and Enforcement of State Taxes, 17 North Carolina Law Review,
130 (1939); National Industrial Conference Board, State and Local
Taxation of Property (1930), 65; National Association of Assessing
Officers, Assessment Principles (1939), 100.
Himself (John A. Zangerle) an outstanding practical assessor
as well as a writer on property appraisal whose name is synonymous
with preeminence.
I The committee makes acknowledgment in the preface to its
report on Judicial Review Agencies (1939) to: "The following
authorities in aministrative and tax law: Professors R. C. Brown,
Indiana University (chairman of the American Bar Association Com-
mittee); Maurice S. Culp, Emory University; Amos H. Eblen, Univer-
sity of Kentucky; Ralph F. Fuchs, Washington University; Spencer D.
Parrott, Syracuse University; and Henry Rattschaeffer, University of
Minnesota."
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"Where there is a competent administrative review agency on the
state level, its determination of questions of fact should be final if
supported by substantial evidence . . .
"Exhaustion of administrative remedies should . . . be
required as a condition precedent to judicial review of question of law
involving valuation of property.
"The judicial concept of constructive fraud should be restricted
by statute to a showing of discrimination and should not extend to a
mere showing of overvaluation."
The committee comments on the recommendations as follows:
"It is believed that the courts themselves would welcome the
adoption of these recommendations. Many of them have displayed
marked reluctance to enter the valuation field and have given effect
to factual findings of the administrative review boards whenever
they could do so in good conscience. Our proposals would relieve
the judiciary of an onerous duty, terminate a certain amount of
inexpert tinkering with assessed valuations, and contribute to a
general strengthening of the administrative review process by con-
centrating responsibility and focusing attention upon the administra-
tive agency."' a
This reference to recent assessment cases would not be com-
plete without some consideration of the McCracken County
eases.
4 3 In essence the court held in these that, since the course
of judicial review was specified by statute to lie from the board
of supervisors to the quarterly court, the findings of the latter,
being a judicial process, were final if not appealed within the
time prescribed by law. Therefore, it was determined, an
equalization order raising assessments in the county generally
was inapplicable to such property as had been valued by order
of the quarterly court. The law, the court found, did not treat
the order of the county judge as a finding of valuation in
relation to the appraisals of other property but as an absolute
finding of 100 per cent of market value.
One consequence of this definition of the law is well illus-
trated in the McCracken County situation. The collection of
data regarding valuations in the county showed the average to
be about 73 per cent of market value. 4 4 If the county judge
actually fixed values at 100 per cent of market value, then the
practical result in the absence of a subsequent adjustment by
'National Association of Assessing Officers, Assessment Organ-
ization and Personnel (1940), sec. IX.
'McCracken Fiscal Court v. McFadden, Reynolds v. Miller, 275
Ky. 819, 122 S. W. (2d) 761 (1938).
"Kentucky Department of Revenue, Assessment of Real Property
in Kentucky Counties (1939), 50. These data were not available at
the time the equalisation order was entered, but other evidence indi-
cated gross undervaluation.
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the department of revenue would have been a valuation figure
for the property of those who appealed about 37 per cent higher
than the average assessed value of other property. If, on the
other hand, the quarterly court actuafly fixed the valuations on
these particular parcels at about the average level, that is about
73 per cent, then the consequence of the law is to give the
person who appealed a final valuation which would have to be
increased 15 per cent to bring it to a parity with the effective
assessment on other property.
A second practical consequence of the decision stems from
a type of abuse resorted to by certain property owners in a
minority of the counties where county judges can be imposed
on. Some property owners in counties having a quarterly court
inadequate to the occasion have made a sort of racket out of
appeals to the court. It is true, this practice depends for
success on the weakness or collusion of the county attorney.
Hereafter, however, the incentive for such a practice will be
even greater in those counties which insist annually on an
equalization order from Frankfort. Admittedly, the number of
counties in which such a practice is possible is limited.
As a third consequence, the situation seems to require legis-
lative correction. If one may accept the finding of the National
Association of Assessing Officers, 45 the correction should be
sought by providing that review orders of the local board of
supervisors be subject to administration review by the depart-
ment of revenue along with equalization proceedings-and not
subject to action by the county judge. The findings of the de-
partment would in the absence of other legislation, of course, be
subject to judicial review as are all valuations by state tax
officials. It is worthy of note that the department of revenue,
on its own motion, may now review findings of the county
boards of supervisors regarding individual properties if there
is no appeal to a court.46
'Assessment Organization and Personnel (1940), sec. VIII.
"Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1936 ed., sec. 4114i-16. Cf. Perry
County v. Kentucky River Coal Corporation, 274 Ky. 235, 118 S. W.
(2d) 550 (1938).
